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Abstract - Traditionally, the US military has sought and 
achieved asymmetric military advantage, i.e. delivered 
tactical blows, quickly, in the right places. However, lately, 
non-state terrorists have seized the asymmetric advantage. 
They use cutting edge Commercial-Off-the-Shelf 
Information Technology (COTS IT) for agile Command, 
Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence 
(C4I). US Military, by contrast, is hamstrung by brittle, 
archaic MILSPEC C3I kit, and by a crushing bureaucracy 
that resists refreshing the technology at anything 
approaching Internet speeds. Members of the US Naval 
Intelligence have voluntarily reached across stovepipes to 
re-establish tactical asymmetric advantage, through Rapid 
Evolutionary Acquisition (REA) of game-changing IT.  It’s 
not about the technology per se; it’s about using IT to give 
warfighters “information high ground.”  Accordingly,  
REA adapts best practices from  success cases in 
government and industry. Meanwhile, Congress has 
demanded DoD fix its broken IT acquisition processes.   
This REA initiative serves as an exemplar.   
Keywords: 2010 NDAA Section 804, IT Acquisition 
Reform, MEIA, MCISR-E, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance. 
1 Introduction 
Asymmetric advantage” is the Holy Grail of warfare.  
Any military’s combat objective is to exploit any and all 
tools and tactics – including dirty tricks -- to win the “high 
ground.”  Sadly, the enemy has found a potent asymmetric 
advantage of it’s own.  Namely, low-budget, non-state 
terrorists routinely apply COTS IT technology as a C4I 
force multiplier [1].  
By contrast, the Blue Force coalition operates within 
brittle stovepipe communications networks wherein so-
called “security” considerations prevent allies from sharing 
critical, perishable, information.  Information collection 
and processing systems are typically either archaic legacy 
dinosaurs, or high tech, expensive, one-of-a-kind, stand-
alone, stopgaps.  
Two independently derived, but mutually 
supportive, plans within the DoN are aggressively 
addressing this issue:  The Marine Corps Intelligence 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Enterprise 
(MCISR-E) Roadmap [2], and the Maritime ISR Enterprise 
Acquisition (MIEA) implementation plan [3].  Both plans 
aim to implement a mandate for profound transformation in 
doctrine, organization, and equipment in response to a 
profoundly changing military threat, fiscal reality, and 
technological landscape. The mandate calls for increased 
operational agility with respect to cross-organizational 
information processing.  Likewise, it calls for increased 
agility with respect to cross-organizational acquisition of 
Information Technology (IT.) That is, it calls for “Rapid 
Evolutionary Acquisition” (REA).  
2 Business Case Analysis 
2.1 Background 
Success in any enterprise follows clear understanding 
of what industry calls a “value proposition” (VP), and 
implementation of an appropriate “business model” 
optimized accordingly.  This truth holds for commercial 
for-profit enterprises, non-government not-for-profit 
enterprises, and government enterprises, including military 
enterprises.  
A Business Case Analysis (BCA) aims to objectively 
define the appropriate VP and suggest the associated 
business model.  The BCA [4] for the Naval (i.e. USN + 
USMC) ISR Capability Evolution (N-ICE) REA process 
seeks to identify a cost-effective approach for establishing 
and governing an acquisition process that will address the 
objectives of MCISR-E.  Myriad Defense watchdog reports 
document general failure by the Defense Enterprise to 
implement IT acquisition transformations, e.g. [5] [6]. The 
findings in all these reports are consistent regarding both 
issues with the “as is” legacy, and the desirable “to be” 
targeted end state.  That is, they agree that the ”as is” 
legacy includes overly bureaucratic overly long serial 
processes, proprietary solutions, and budgets and 
requirements that are too big and continually expanding.  
Likewise, watchdog reports consistently agree that the “to 
be” target end state should include parallel “spiral” process, 
open modular design, and iterative customer-in-the-loop 
requirements development.   
The issue has gotten so bad that in Section 804 of 
the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress 
has required the Department of Defense (DoD) to report its 
specific plan to fix its failed IT acquisition process. Most of 
these reports, including DoD’s response to Congress [7], 
lack specific guidance about how to bridge the “as-is”/”to-
be” gap.  That these successive reports have consistently 
reached the same conclusions over the past decade 
validates Einstein’s observation: “The same thinking and 
processes that created the problem won’t solve it.”  
Two recent reports that do provide some specific 
REA implementation guidance serve as key references for 
this BCA.  One is the Maritime ISR Enterprise Acquisition 
Study (MIEA.)  The other is the Association for Enterprise 
Information (AFEI) Industry Task Force Report on 2010 
National Defense Appropriations Act (NDAA) Section 804 
Industry Perspective on the Future of DoD IT Acquisition 
(TF 804 Report.)  
The approach to the N-ICE BCA was to build on top 
of the body of watchdog reports in general, and the MIEA 
study and TF 804 report in particular.   The BCA authors 
studied documentation of the exemplar REA processes 
enumerated above, and interviewed expert participants in 
those processes.  They also interviewed Marine Corps 
Subject Matter Experts (SME) in Intelligence operations 
and supporting acquisition activities.   The BCA authors 
socialized their tasking and initial findings with senior 
leaders within USMC and USN C4ISR Headquarters.  
2.2 Measures of Success 
Per basic tenets of leadership and managent, the BCA 
applies the following universal success factors as basis for 
its findings and recommendations.  
1. You get what you measure; measure what matters. 
2. You get what you pay for; buy what matters.  
3. Empower good, well-trained, people to apply all your 
resources against your customers’ most critical needs 
per #1 and #2 above. 
In keeping with those universal tenets, metrics for 
N-ICE will be based on “Value-of-Acquisition” (VoA) as a 
function of cost, performance, and schedule according to 
the following model: 
VoA = (normalized value-per-capability) X (#-of-
capabilities-acquired) ÷(discounted time-to-deliver-
capability) ÷ (cost) 
Note that in this model, the critical factor is “value.”  Given 
that the application domain is intelligence, value is most 
likely to be associated with the quality of collection, 
processing, and delivery of information.  “Time” and 
“cost” either enhance or detract from basic value.  If either 
“time” or “cost” grows to the point where VoA drops 
below some threshold value, it is time to walk away from 
sunk costs, and/or de-scope the effort. 
In order to most credibly define “value-per-
capability” the BCA concludes that the N-ICE pilot project 
should immediately tackle the most critical tactical edge 
issues, e.g. countering IED emplacement; interdicting high 
value individuals; countering ambushes [8]; etc.  Definition 
of “information value” flows from analysis of the 
associated critical information transactions validated by 
operational SMEs.  The key is to objectively link desired 
outcomes, such as “fewer casualties due to IED,” to the 
specific classes of information transactions, such as smart 
pushes of pre-defined critical conditions of interest, that 
enable them.  
2.3 Build on top of observed success 
 “‘Best practice’, useful standards, and good architecture 
all follow repeated success on the ground.  So, therefore, 
does good policy.”  [9] Accordingly, the N-ICE BCA 
proposes adapting non-theoretical processes that have 
demonstrably, successfully, and repeatedly executed 
aspects of REA.  Exemplars include the USAF Tactical 
Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) ; Special 
Operations Research and Development Command 
(SORDAC) ; Navy Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion 
(ARCI) program ; and a panel of industry experts.  
The BCA distilled multiple critical success factors 
that are common across all or most of the REA exemplars.   
Those success factors point to a number of sub-processes 
that are critical to success of REA. See figure 1.  
Fig. 1: Study of successful exemplars of REA reveals this list of effective 
practices common among them 
 3  Critical path and plan of action 
3.1  Create enterprise value-delivery-chain 
Today’s acquisition process measures and 
incentivizes “compliance” and “size of program”.  
Programs pass through each gate in the long serial 
process by delivering expensive, thick, static, paper 
artifacts that document compliance with hundreds of 
disparate and occasionally conflicting policies and 
standards.  These compliance artifacts are largely 
redundant across multiple programs with similar 
parameters.   
So called Earned Value Management (EVM) 
metrics track costs and schedule but assume the 
“value” is contractually well defined.  However IT 
evolves so quickly, and IT-enabled capability is so 
inherently abstract, that it is impossible to define 
“stable requirements” in the traditional sense.   
Applying waterfall development processes that 
are designed to deliver stable, well-defined “systems” 
to develop abstract rapidly evolving “capability” 
inevitably causes schedules to slip to the right and 
costs to go up.  Meanwhile the value of the 
contractually specified deliverable decreases because 
it becomes archaic before it is deployed.    
Recent policy changes recognize this issue and 
mandate that programs focus on “speed-to-
capability.”  However, the industrial best practice is to 
focus on “time-to-value.”  “Capability” is not the 
same thing, necessarily, as “value.” Success requires 
understanding what the customer truly values. 
Achieving and maintaining that understanding in the 
rapidly evolving IT landscape demands that 
customers participate as literal partners with 
developers throughout capability lifecycles.   
To address these issues, N-ICE team members 
have developed prototypes for a “Value-based 
Acquisition Framework” (VAF) [10] and 
Semantically Informed Dynamic Engineering of 
Capabilities and Requirements (SIDECAR) [11]. 
The Value-based Acquisition Framework 
(VAF) is an IT Acquisition governance model based 
on commercial best practice adapted to specific 
Defense acquisition policy requirements.  VAF 
expands and abstracts traditional DoD “Availability” 
metrics such as “Operational Availability” Ao to 
develop objective time-based Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP) appropriate for software-intensive 
systems of systems.  
If you think about it, “availability” is really a 
simple ratio of value returned over total cost. 
Generally the Availability of Value in an Acquisition 
Portfolio = (normalized value-per-capability) x (# of 
capabilities delivered) ÷ (time-to-deliver discounted 
in favor of sooner) ÷ (cost).  In particular VAF 
addresses both the DoD “Sustainment KPP” (S-KPP) 
and the “Net-Ready KPP” (NR-KPP).  In this way, 
VAF provides an engineering assurance model for 
developing systems that deliver sustainable 
information dominance.   
The NR-KPP is a relatively new construct 
within DoD. It aims to be an improvement on the 
superseded “Interoperability KPP.” NR-KPP 
recognizes that many-to-many networks obviate the 
simple point-to-point bit-exchange model of 
interoperability. Accordingly, the NR-KPP policy 
document [12] requires programs to objectively 
demonstrate that information exchanges add value, 
that they comply with enterprise “solution 
architectures” and associated open standard 
interfaces, that they appropriately address Information 
Assurance (IA), and that they comply with 
appropriate radio spectrum policies.  However, the 
NR-KPP policy does not provide specific, objective 
guidance.  In the VAF construct, solutions 
architectures, interfaces, IA, and spectrum are 
considered elements of “Information Processing 
Efficiency” (IPE). Likewise, in the VAF construct 
“adding value” means achieving measurably better 
mission outcomes.  Hence, in the VAF approach, NR-
KPP correlates measurable improvement in IPE to 
measurable improvement in traditional operational 
effect metrics such as Probability of Kill (Pk), 
Planning Cycle Time, Friendly Fire incidents, etc.  
VAF also recognizes that sustainment of 
modern IT systems requires process-level metrics that 
enforce speed-to-capability requirements. In other 
words sustainability is equivalent to existence of a 
process that delivers capability on pace with 
technology evolution.  Hence VAF includes process-
level time-to-value efficiency metrics.  Accelerating 
time-to-value depends on effective use of modularity, 
i.e. build-time interoperability of components. The 
VAF S-KPP, “Availability of Net-readiness” Anr, 
specifies both threshold and objective speed-to-
capability requirements commensurate with “Moore’s 
Law.”  To achieve aggressive speed-to-capability, the 
VAF S-KPPs emphasize re-use of pre-certified COTS 
and GOTS components.  It also considers the time it 
takes to test and certify capability bundles.  “Re-
usable components” should equate to “pre-tested and 
certified components.” After all, build time 
interoperability is not about how many components 
you reuse; it is about effectively and efficiently 
composing and deploying useful capability by re-
combining “Value-off-the-Shelf.” (VOTS).  See 
figure 2. 
Fig. 2: The VAF speed-to-capability process metric is called “Net Ready 
Availability” (Anr). Anr is a parameterization of the S-KPP that is 
analogous to Ao, but treats the acquisition process itself as within the 
boundary of the system of interest. In fact, the acquisition process is the 
part of the overall system responsible for delivering continuous 
improvements. 
SIDECAR is an automated, parallel, approach 
to eliminate the current serial paper-intensive 
engineering and documentation process.     The idea is 
to link multiple complex databases that address 
policy, requirements, architecture, technology, and 
resources via cutting edge artificial intelligence.  That 
complexity “under the hood” is hidden from the user 
but made useful through an intuitive GUI.  Picture 
something like TurboTax for IT system engineers and 
acquisition professionals.  
A contractor, Cycorp (www.cyc.com), delivered a 
small demonstration of SIDECARE in a matter of a few 
months [11] by using its existing, enormous ontology, 
knowledge base, natural language dialogue and inference 
engine technologies.   SIDECAR starts with partial 
information about organizations  and systems of interest, 
and a model of information required to populate sections of 
a particular requirements document.  SIDECAR uses that 
model to conduct a TurboTax-like clarification dialogue 
with its user, collecting ever-more information as it does 
so. While the man-machine dialogue occurs in English, the 
internal SIDECAR model is represented in formal logic 
(n
th
-order predicate calculus). The interactive activity 
occurs in real time, incrementally.  Therefore users can 
view the evolving English document at will.  Rather than 
edit that document, when/if a change is necessary, 
SIDECAR points the user back to the appropriate menu or 
question. Changes propagate across databases and 
documents automatically.      
3.2 Implement viable business model for 
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) 
DoD acquisition policy has, for sometime, 
required programs to leverage MOSA.  That policy 
has clearly not resulted in the kind of rapid, Defense 
Enterprise-wide, plug and play, propagation of IT 
capability it envisioned.  The industrial best practice 
for MOSA is called Product Line Architecture (PLA). 
PLA provides detailed technical specifications for 
persistent modular IT “platforms.” The platform then 
allows efficient re-use of components and enables 
lucrative time-to-value for multiple IT-enabled 
enterprises.  
Apple iPhone, iPad, and iPod, and MacBooks 
all share the same PLA, for example.  Google and 
Microsoft likewise specify their own versions of PLA.  
In industrial PLA “open” is obviously a relative term.  
However, in every case of effective PLA, “open” is 
described objectively and in great technical detail.  
That is not the case in most defense system 
architectures.  
Carnegie Mellon University Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) has reported several case 
studies and designed a methodology to  [13] exploit 
PLA within government.  Indeed, SEI has offered a 
training course in PLA for several years. The reason 
the Defense Enterprise has not had much success with 
PLA, despite technical competence, is perhaps lack of 
commitment to the VP and business models that make 
PLA lucrative in industry.   
 In the current Defense Acquisition model, 
“systems” are certified as is.  Any change to the 
certified configuration mandates re-certification or 
waiver. Therefore, in order to make the VOTS model 
credible, generic plug-and-play components must 
inherit the various onerous approvals and 
certifications from the PLA itself.  That is, the PLA 
must provide a high assurance modularization of the 
security and interoperability features, which can be 
invoked by generic components.  Further, the various 
authorities such as JITC and the appropriate 
Designated Approval Authorities (DAA) must 
approve the modular approach to certification.  
Neither of these things has been done before, but the 
N-ICE team is making good progress on both.   
Indeed the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) 
Rapid Prototyping (RapidPro) team has developed a 
prototype VOTS-based tactical Persistent ISR (PISR) 
PLA [14] planned for accreditation by second quarter 
FY12.       
 
Fig. 3. By deliberately creating a customer-centric market that lowers 
barriers to entry to both providers and consumers, the Defense Enterprise 
can finally leverage the value proposition associated with Modular Open 
Standard Architecture.    
3.3 Create persistent, distributed, 
development, test, & certification environment 
The VOTS Acquisition Strategy is just a variant 
of the well-established commercial “Apps Store” 
model. One of the universal best practices among 
these “Apps Store” variants is a persistent, virtual, test 
& certification environment with low barrier to entry.  
A would be provider signs onto a web portal and 
registers as a developer.  In so doing, he or she agrees 
to a particular intellectual property rights regime, 
certain technological standards, and rules of behavior.  
The developer is given a virtual development 
environment, Software Development Kits (SDK) and 
compliance guidance.  When the app (or whatever) is 
ready, the developer submits it to the central authority 
(be that eBay, Amazon, Google, Apple, etc) for test 
and certification.  Shortly, say days, later the app is 
either certified and deployed, or the developer 
receives guidance about how to fix it.   
Various Defense Enterprise initiatives have 
attempted to duplicate this test and certification 
model.  However success requires a well specified 
enterprise IT platform with embedded, objective, 
machine readable, interoperability and IA controls; 
easy continuous access to the platform by consumers; 
and a business model that allows providers to readily 
onboard their offerings and immediately receive 
compensation.  None of the Defense Enterprise efforts 
to date have had any of those characteristics.  The N-
ICE team aims to be the first.   
The prototype N-ICE test and certification 
infrastructure is called Open System Test Framework 
(OSTF).  OSTF includes a reference implementation 
of PISR PLA within a service-oriented framework of 
test tools and mission models and simulations.  
Simulations are live, virtual, and constructive 
representations of modeled warfighting scenarios.  
3.4   Create VOTS Marketplace 
Given its large investment and compelling 
mission, the Defense Enterprise should be able to 
influence the COTS IT market to evolve in directions 
that align with Defense priorities. (See figure 3.) 
Historically, government has had the greatest success 
influencing markets when it does two things well: (1) 
funding development of breakthrough infrastructure, 
e.g. Internet Protocol and Global Positioning System; 
and (2) reducing commercial risk by providing 
lightweight governance through pragmatic 
certifications.  In other words, the government 
provides compelling new raw technology to the 
industrial base. Industry innovates within the 
boundary conditions provided by government.  The 
more broadly and equitably the technology 
distribution, and the more pragmatic and 
unburdensome the certification requirements, the 
more quickly the commercial market delivers ever-
more valued capabilities.  
The N-ICE project aims to apply this model of 
government-industry partnership via a project called 
“PISR PlugFest.”  Generally, a “plug fest” is an 
industrial best practice for demonstrating, rather than 
merely claiming, interoperability.  In plug fests, 
compliance with standards is necessary, but not 
sufficient.  Plug fests require solution providers to 
prove interoperability by actually configuring their 
offerings in the specified environment, against 
specified use cases and metrics, in run time. The 
venue for a plug fest is usually a series of runtime 
demonstrations performed within a computer network 
laboratory. Over the course of the event, participants 
tweak their software per customer-defined value 
criteria and compete against each other. Interoperable 
“killer” apps that “wow” the operational community 
judges inevitably win the prizes.  
PISR PlugFest will use OSTF as its 
demonstration environment, and the embedded 
instantiation of PISR PLA as its baseline “plug.” 
“Judges” will include members of the tactical ISR 
community as well as certification authorities such as 
USMC DAA, NSA, and JITC. In preparation for the 
PISR PlugFest, government and industry experts will 
study critical mission threads.  Together, they will 
refine the PISR PLA specification to align COTS 
state-of-the-art with military tactical priorities. The 
resulting SDKs, specifications, and evaluation 
criteria, will be provided to industry at large as 
“Government Furnished Equipment” (GFE.)  
To provide the VP, N-ICE will recruit 
government offices to issue Broad Agency 
Announcements (BAA) inviting COTS IT industry to 
demonstrate required capability in runtime. Some 
vendors will win contracts from the BAAs. All 
vendor offerings that add value to mission thread 
objectives, and successfully configure with PISR PLA 
IA and IoP services, will earn “pre-approved net-
ready product” status. N-ICE will establish 
convenient IDIQ, or similar, contract vehicles for pre-
approved offerings.   
3.5  Learn by doing and empower a cadre of 
government professionals 
The N-ICE approach is to establish a temporary 
project office with mission to “learn how to fish” in order 
to “teach how to fish.   The N-ICE pilot operates under an 
18-36 month charter to do just that.  
Clearly the best way to accomplish any critical 
task is to assign it to your best person, let that person 
hand pick a team, and free up the team from all other 
responsibilities.  All good leaders know this to be 
true.  The N-ICE project will apply this tenet by hand 
picking a small elite team of proven professionals.  
Per the N-ICE BCA, the requisite skill sets are not 
necessarily those found in a traditional program 
office.  
4  Conclusions 
When it comes to fixing IT acquisition, we members 
of the Defense Enterprise have all the policy we need to get 
our own houses in order.  Per lessons of the past, new laws 
and regulations will not help until we “in the trenches” 
commit to new thinking and processes. We owe it to our 
front line warriors to get this done. The N-ICE initiative is 
viable and scalable.  Its leaders are willing to scale up in 
order to embrace any and all comers.  
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